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The Ontario Human Rights Code’s 
Distributive and Recognitional  
Functions in the Workplace
Claire Mummé*
In her analysis of the purpose of the Ontario Human Rights Code, the 
author draws on Nancy Fraser’s distinction between the two main strategies 
that have been used to combat inequality. Strategies of redistribution, which 
prevailed among equality activists in the early twentieth century, see inequality 
as arising from unequal access to economic resources. Strategies of recognition, 
which have come into prominence more recently, see inequality as arising from 
sociocultural prejudices that deny equal recognition to disadvantaged groups. 
Although the Ontario Human Rights Code is often seen as focusing on rec-
ognitional issues, the author argues that through the market relationships the 
Code regulates and the remedial powers it grants, it also adopts a redistribution 
strategy designed to address the economic impact of prohibited discrimination: 
that is, the Code aims to change how resources and opportunities are to be 
allocated for those with protected identity traits. An understanding of the inter-
action between the Code’s recognitional and redistributive functions sheds light 
on its purpose and method of operation, as well as on its relationship to other 
equality-seeking legal mechanisms such as collective bargaining and the equal-
ity rights provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Thus, the 
need for a range of legal tools to counter inequality in different contexts comes 
more clearly into focus.
1. INTRODUCTION
Andrew Pinto’s recent review of Ontario’s statutory human 
rights regime1 offers us a useful opportunity to reflect on the Ontario 
Human Rights Code’s2 particular role in addressing inequality. This 
 * Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Windsor. My thanks go to 
the organizers and participants in the workshop, “Adjudicating Human Rights 
in the Workplace: After Ontario’s Pinto Report, Where Do We Go Next?” at the 
Queen’s University Centre for Law in the Contemporary Workplace, for helpful 
feedback and stimulating conversation. 
 1 Ontario, Ministry of the Attorney General, Report of the Ontario Human Rights 
Review 2012, by Andrew Pinto (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2012) 
[Pinto Report]. 
 2 RSO 1990, c H.19 [OHRC].
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paper focuses that reflection on the workplace context. To do so, it 
draws from the writing of Nancy Fraser, who suggested that there 
have historically been two main strategies for addressing inequality 
— strategies of redistribution and strategies of recognition.3 Applying 
that typology to the Code, I argue that human rights statutes are con-
cerned with the psychosocial and economic effects of misrecognition 
discrimination. I emphasize that although the Code is commonly seen 
as dealing only with recognitional issues, it is also fundamentally 
concerned with the distributional effects of discrimination. Through 
an analysis of obligations and remedial powers under the Code, I 
aim to demonstrate that its primary purpose is to regulate the socio-
economic effects of identity-based and status-based discrimination on 
the market.
Thinking about the Code’s redistributive and recognition func-
tions permits us both to identify its core operational features and to 
compare it with other equality-seeking legal mechanisms. Examining 
the different goals and methods of operation of diverse legal tools that 
seek to meet the problem of inequality may enable us to build a more 
robust and cohesive approach to social and economic inequality. 
Given the centrality of the workplace to strategies of distribution and 
recognition, I will focus on the Code’s application to the employment 
relationship.4 In Part 2 of this paper, I briefly outline different con-
ceptions of inequality that dominated 20th century North American 
political discourse. In Part 3, I argue that the Code addresses what 
Fraser called misrecognition discrimination in market-based relation-
ships. In Part 4 I sketch the Code’s distributive operation, and suggest 
how the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) can tighten some 
of its remedial jurisprudence to fully achieve the statute’s purposes. I 
conclude by comparing the Code’s approach to issues of recognition 
and redistribution with the approaches of other equality-seeking legal 
mechanisms, such as collective bargaining and the constitutional 
equality guarantee in section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms.5 Some of the narrative in this paper will cover familiar 
 3 Nancy Fraser & Axel Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-
Philosophical Exchange (New York: Verso Books, 2003).
 4 OHRC, supra note 2. The analysis also broadly applies to other Canadian human 
rights codes, but may differ in detail with the wording of the particular code.
 5 Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 
(UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
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ground for those who work in the area of human rights, but this is 
necessary in order to identify the Code’s underlying rationale and 
distributional features. 
2. VISIONS OF EQUALITY: REDISTRIBUTION 
OR RECOGNITION?
At different times in the 20th century, two perspectives on 
inequality dominated North American political discourse, each with 
a different view of inequality’s root causes. The first perspective, the 
distributional approach, sees differential access to economic resour-
ces as the cause of inequality.6 In other words, marginalization is 
due to the unequal distribution of wealth: inequality is not primarily 
rooted in identity-based factors, but is rather a structural feature of a 
liberal capitalist system. From a distributional perspective, discrimin-
ation on the ground of race (for example) is perceived as a function of 
class and the poverty that emerges from a history of unequal access 
to economic opportunities such as education, jobs and housing. The 
necessary response is to change the distributive basis of entitlements, 
which will eliminate any difference in access to opportunities based 
on race and other marginalized identity traits. 
The second perspective, which Fraser called misrecognition, 
came to prominence in the 1970s during the post-Civil Rights era 
in the United States. It sees inequality as stemming from socio-
cultural prejudices against identity-based traits. These prejudices 
deny trait-holders the dignity of equal community participation and 
recognition.7 From the misrecognition perspective, adopting facially 
neutral rules of market access is insufficient to address inequality, 
because equalizing the rules of resource distribution will not stop the 
operation of identity-based prejudices and stereotypes in the market 
and in social relationships. For example, even if men and women 
were given equal access to education, differential assumptions would 
likely persist in the labour market to shape ideas about female and 
 6 Recent historical research emphasizes the degree to which early legal strategies 
for dealing with racial discrimination in the United States pursued claims to 
equal entitlement to economic resources. See Risa Goluboff, The Lost Promise of 
Civil Rights (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2007).
 7 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity (Cambridge, 
Mass: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
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male workers’ skills and interests. The way to address misrecognition 
discrimination, then, is to attack cultural norms that attach value to 
certain identity traits and not others.8 This requires recognizing differ-
ences rather than creating formal equality of opportunity.9
Writing in the 1990s, Fraser sought to draw attention to the 
relationship between economic and identity-based inequality. She 
described the tension in the 1980s and 1990s between strategies 
of redistribution and strategies of recognition, which seemed to 
pit against each other two visions of the causes of inequality. 
Redistribution strategies have historically called for a priori changes 
in mechanisms of resource allocation, aiming for large-scale pol-
itical and legislative changes to methods of capital accumulation, 
to rules on taxation and property, and to social wage protection 
schemes. Those strategies also looked to resource reallocation within 
employment relationships, through trade unionism and collective 
bargaining.10 Their overall aim was to reduce or eliminate material 
inequality across the social spectrum.
By contrast, strategies for addressing misrecognition and iden-
tity-based discrimination have looked primarily to statutory reforms 
aimed at eliminating differential treatment in such private-sector 
areas as housing, services and employment. These strategies centred 
on the individual anti-discrimination rights of those with denigrated 
identity traits, rather than on the community as a whole or on resource 
distribution.11 Their emphasis was on the ex post facto enforcement 
of individual anti-discrimination rights in the courts. Fraser argued 
that in the 1960s and 1970s, when issues of recognition first emerged 
with force, they were very closely tied to concerns about inequality 
 8 Fraser & Honneth, supra note 3 at 15.
 9 Kimberlé Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, 
and Violence Against Women of Color” (1991) 43:6 Stan L Rev 1241.
10 In other parts of the world, redistribution of economic resources through trade 
unionism has had a different shape, because of industry-wide collective bar-
gaining or because of an explicit bargaining relationship between trade unions 
and the state.
11 Owen Fiss, “A Theory of Fair Employment Laws” (1971) 38:2 U Chicago L Rev 
235. See also Racial Discrimination Act 1944, SO 1944, c 51; Fair Employment 
Act, SO 1951, c 24; Fair Accommodation Practices Act, SO 1954, c 28.
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of wealth, but that by the 1980s and 1990s they had displaced those 
concerns. In her words, “questions of recognition [were] serving less 
to supplement, complicate and enrich redistributive struggles than to 
marginalize, eclipse and displace them.”12 Thus, through the 1980s 
and 1990s, the structural effects of unequal wealth distribution on the 
market were politically separated from the social and psychological 
questions of identity and difference.
But, Fraser argued, positing a tension between the two strategies 
is analytically and politically unsound, because most grounds of mar-
ginalization are constructed along both economic and identity-based 
lines.13 Since neither is a subset of the other, no one strategy can fully 
address the oppression produced by inequality:
Rooted at once in the economic structure and the status order of society, 
[two-dimensional divisions] involve injustices that are traceable to both. Two-
dimensionally subordinated groups suffer both maldistribution and misrecog-
nition in forms where neither of these injustices is an indirect effect of the 
other, but where both are primary and co-original.14
12 Fraser & Honneth, supra note 3 at 92; Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking Recognition” 
(2000) 3 New Left Review 107 at 110-112.
13 Fraser’s argument is compatible with but different from the concept of inter-
sectionality that has been so influential in discussions of structural inequality. 
Intersectionality emphasizes the fact that we do not identify solely on the basis 
of one characteristic: I am not only a woman, not only white, not only short in 
stature. Just as our identities are constructed around the knitted facets of our 
characteristics and experiences, so too are the ways we experience discrimina-
tion. Describing the experience of discrimination by a woman of colour as based 
only on race or gender prioritizes the experience of the majority group within 
each category (white women, men of colour). Intersectional analysis empha-
sizes the differences within groups and the specific ways in which the multiple 
facets of identity can compound the occurrence and experience of discrimina-
tion. Fraser asked different but complementary questions. She sought to draw 
out the relationship between economic inequality and the inequality of iden-
tity-based misrecognition, to get at the interconstructed nature of socioeconomic 
subjugation along economic and identity-based lines. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, 
“Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of 
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics” (1989) U 
Chicago Legal F 139. 
14 Fraser & Honneth, supra note 3 at 19.
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The argument is that misrecognition and maldistribution are separate 
but interconnected issues, which must both be addressed in dealing with 
the structural inequality of marginalized groups.15 
Since about 2000, equality activists have increasingly recognized 
the relationship between systems of economic distribution and status-
based discrimination.16 It has become increasingly clear that the economic 
inequality experienced by minority groups cannot be eliminated in a sys-
tem of general inequality premised on differential access to economic 
resources, but also that instituting facially neutral rules for access to and 
distribution of economic resources will not eliminate the operation of 
social and cultural prejudices in the market.17 Fraser has argued, as have 
Sandra Fredman and Judy Fudge, that we need strategies which can dis-
mantle discrimination on the basis of identity and status traits as well as 
strategies that concentrate on unequal economic resource distribution.18 
Moreover, although these two types of strategies will have different 
methods and targets, they must be interlinked. Identifying and elabor-
ating on the particular functions of different equality-seeking legal tools 
will help with that project. It is with this task in mind that I address the 
Ontario Human Rights Code’s distributive and recognitional functions.
15 Fraser offers gender as an example of two-dimensional subordination. On the 
one hand, gender is used to separate paid and unpaid labour, and to divide access 
to higher-paid and lower-paid jobs. It therefore serves as a “class-like differenti-
ation” which creates a form of distributional inequality. On the other hand, there 
is also a status-based differentiation that relies on gender, in which cultural per-
ceptions of ability and worth operate to form assumptions about women’s roles 
in society. In this sense gender discrimination is also a form of misrecognition. In 
Fraser’s words, “redressing gender injustice, in any case, requires changing both 
the economic structure and the status order of society.” See ibid at 21-22.
16 Sandra Fredman, “Redistribution and Recognition: Reconciling Inequalities” 
(2007) 23:2 SAJHR 214 at 214-215.
17 Interest in the relationship between the social experience of inequality and its 
material basis is most apparent at the international level, with the growing consti-
tutional jurisprudence on socioeconomic rights in such countries as South Africa 
and India. Those two countries have led the way in giving jurisprudential meaning 
to socioeconomic rights, although how that should be done remains the subject of 
deep debate. On South Africa’s socioeconomic constitutional rights jurisprudence, 
see Marius Pieterse, “Eating Socioeconomic Rights: The Usefulness of Rights 
Talk in Alleviating Social Hardship Revisited” (2007) 29:3 Hum Rts Q 796.
18 Fraser & Honneth, supra note 3; Fredman supra note 16; Judy Fudge, “The 
Canadian Charter of Rights: Recognition, Redistribution, and the Imperialism 
of the Courts” in Tom Campbell, Keith Ewing & Adam Tomkins, eds, Sceptical 
Essays on Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 335.
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3. DISCRIMINATION IN MARKET-BASED RELATIONSHIPS
How does the Human Rights Code fit into Fraser’s dual typology 
of equality? As I will seek to demonstrate, the Code is an instrument that 
addresses the problem of misrecognition, but it has a particular concern 
with the economic and social effects of misrecognition in the market. 
Since the late 1990s, the Supreme Court of Canada’s constitutional 
equality jurisprudence under section 15 of the Charter has focused on the 
social indignity and the psychological effects of state discrimination (what 
I will call psychosocial harm), rather than on its economic consequences.19 
19 The Supreme Court’s initial account of equality and discrimination under the 
Charter in Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143, 56 
DLR (4th) 1, provided some scope for distributional concerns, but this has been 
slowly whittled away, beginning with the Court’s decision in Law v Canada 
(Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 SCR 497 at para 51, 170 
DLR (4th) 1, where it explained the purpose of section 15(1) as follows:
It may be said that the purpose of s. 15(1) is to prevent the violation of essential 
human dignity and freedom through the imposition of disadvantage, stereotyp-
ing, or political or social prejudice, and to promote a society in which all persons 
enjoy equal recognition at law as human beings or as members of Canadian 
society, equally capable and equally deserving of concern, respect and con-
sideration. Legislation which effects differential treatment between individuals 
or groups will violate this fundamental purpose where those who are subject to 
differential treatment fall within one or more enumerated or analogous grounds, 
and where the differential treatment reflects the stereotypical application of pre-
sumed group or personal characteristics, or otherwise has the effect of perpetu-
ating or promoting the view that the individual is less capable, or less worthy of 
recognition or value as a human being or as a member of Canadian society. 
In Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v NAPE, 2004 SCC 66 at para 40, [2004] 3 
SCR 381, the Supreme Court explained that the repeal of Newfoundland’s pay 
equity legislation was discriminatory, not because of the female hospital workers’ 
monetary loss but because they “were being told that they did not deserve equal 
pay despite making a contribution of equal value.” Thus, rather than focusing on 
the actual economic loss, the Court was concerned with the psychological and 
social effects of being given less legal protection by the state. In R v Kapp, 2008 
SCC 41, 2008 2 SCR 483 and more recently in Withler v Canada (AG), 2011 SCC 
12, 2001 1 SCR 396, the Court has moved away from Law and has reaffirmed 
the test set out in Andrews. However, it appears to have done so primarily to 
eliminate the formalism associated with comparator group analysis. It remains to 
be seen whether the Court’s current approach will open more space for thinking 
about the perpetuation of disadvantage in economic terms as well as in social and 
political terms. On what the Withler decision suggests for future equality jurispru-
dence, see Jenner Koshan & Jonnette Watson Hamilton, “Meaningless Mantra: 
Substantive Equality after Withler” (2011) 16:1 Rev Const Stud 31.
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The Court has explained discrimination as a process that denigrates an 
individual’s sense of self-worth by suggesting that she is less able than 
others to participate in the community. As we know, however, dis-
crimination does not merely suggest that an individual is less capable 
of participating in the community; it creates actual barriers to socio-
economic participation. The Code is focused on attacking those bar-
riers in regulated relationships. 
The Code primarily regulates market-based relationships 
(including employment, housing services and contracting) among 
private parties as well as with government entities.20 The rationale 
is that those are the socioeconomic relationships that are most sig-
nificant for constructing and reproducing discriminatory exclusions. 
They are the most central to our economic and social lives; they are 
where we find the means to support ourselves financially, to obtain 
housing, to enter into economic transactions, and to amass the social 
and financial security which permits active political participation in 
our communities. As Denise Réaume has noted, “[t]hese areas are 
covered because of their historical implication in social patterns of 
inequality that have been deep and damaging, as well as their ongoing 
importance in giving people a modicum of control over the shape and 
quality of their lives.”21 
Within the regulated relationships, the Code enumerates a closed 
list of prohibited grounds of discrimination, which range from immut-
able personal characteristics such as race, ancestry, and ethnicity22 to 
20 OHRC, supra note 2, ss 1-8. Through its regulation of services, the Code also 
applies to the state in its public capacity. As I have argued elsewhere, however, 
the regulation of public services engages a number of issues otherwise absent 
from the Code’s operation. Its overall design and historical evolution primarily 
target private-sector relationships, as well as action by the state operating in 
market-based relationships. On the democratic issues raised by the application 
of the Code to government services, see Claire Mummé, “At the Crossroads in 
Discrimination Law: How the Human Rights Codes Overtook the Charter in 
Canadian Government Services Cases” (2012) 9 JL & Equality 103.
21 Denise Réaume, “Defending the Human Rights Codes from the Charter” (2012) 
9 JL & Equality 67 at 69.
22 The protected grounds under the Code are race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, 
ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender 
expression, age, marital status, family status, disability or the receipt of public 
assistance. OHRC, supra note 2, ss 1-8.
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more class-based grounds such as receipt of government assistance.23 
The use of prohibited grounds of discrimination in market-based 
decision-making is regulated through a two-stage process. At the first 
stage, to make out a prima facie claim of workplace discrimination 
in Ontario, a claimant must prove that there has been differential 
treatment or adverse effect in access to employment or in the course 
of employment, that the treatment was on the basis of a prohibited 
ground, and that it has had a detrimental impact on the claimant. This 
assumes that all direct and adverse-impact differential treatment vio-
lates human dignity unless the respondent can justify its necessity. 
Once a prima facie case is made, the burden at the second stage shifts 
to the employer to demonstrate that the differential treatment was a 
bona fide occupational requirement (BFOR). The employer must show 
that the impugned policy, practice or decision was rationally con-
nected to the performance of the job, that it was adopted in good faith, 
and that it was necessary to fulfill a legitimate work-related purpose.24
As Réaume has argued, this analytical structure is designed to 
require justification of the use of a protected status trait or proxy 
measure in decision-making, and justification of the workplace goal 
itself.25 In a case of direct discrimination, the question is whether the 
actual use of a prohibited ground is an accurate measure for the legit-
imate workplace goal. In a case of adverse-effect discrimination, the 
targets of the inquiry are otherwise neutral proxy measurements that 
have a differential impact on those with a protected attribute — for 
example, very high physical endurance requirements for firefighters, 
which disproportionately disqualify women.26 A proxy will act as 
23 Other provinces have similar provisions: Alberta Human Rights Act, RSA 2000, 
c A-25.5, Preamble; Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, SS 1979, c S-24.1, s (1)
(m.01); Human Rights Act, RSY 2002, c 116, s 7(l); Human Rights Act, RSPEI 
1988, c H-12, Preamble; Human Rights Act, RSNS 1989, c 214, s 5(1)(t).
24 British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v BCGEU, 
[1999] 3 SCR 3, 176 DLR (4th) 1 [Meiorin]; British Columbia (Superintendent 
of Motor Vehicles) v British Columbia (Council of Human Rights), [1999] 3 SCR 
868 at para 21, 181 DLR (4th) 385 [Grismer].
25 Réaume, supra note 21 at 76-77.
26 Sujit Choudry, “Distribution vs. Recognition: The Case of Anti-Discrimination 
Laws” (2000) 9 Geo Mason L Rev 145 at 155. 
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an imperfect predictor where some of the people with the particular 
attribute cannot meet the legitimate workplace goal, even if some 
of them can. Where a prohibited ground is a perfect proxy for the 
ability to do the job, a BFOR defence is not necessary because, in 
Réaume’s words, “the perfect correlation between ground and quali-
fications for the job means that discrimination is negated. Only when 
a ground is an imperfect proxy is there something that the respondent 
has to justify according to the BFR test.”27 In such cases, the BFOR 
analysis requires an employer to demonstrate that “it is not possible 
to identify and include the members of the excluded group who are 
qualified” except by using the challenged proxy.28 The last step of the 
BFOR analysis requires employers to demonstrate that the challenged 
decision is the least discriminatory method of achieving the legit-
imate objective because it is impossible to accommodate individual 
employees short of undue hardship. The BFOR test therefore requires 
an employer to justify both its workplace goals and the measures 
chosen to attain them. 
It is clear that in subjecting regulated behaviour to a test of accur-
acy and relevance, the Code does not challenge the market’s general 
operation. Rather, it seeks to bar the use of decision-making tools that 
are inaccurate predictors of capacity and behaviour.29 Market trans-
actions operate on the basis of conscious and unconscious evaluations 
of capacity and worth, which encode subtle cultural perceptions of 
individual and group value. The use of such proxy measurements 
builds up in the market over time, creating social and economic block-
ages for those with protected identity traits, to the point of becoming 
27 Réaume, supra note 21 at 77-78.
28 Ibid at 82.
29 As Kenneth Arrow noted, what is or is not relevant to decision-making is a 
normative issue. Someone who holds prejudiced views may indeed view the pro-
tected identity traits as very relevant to making a decision aimed at fulfilling that 
discriminatory purpose. See Kenneth Arrow, “The Theory of Discrimination” 
(Paper delivered at Conference on Discrimination in Labor Markets, Princeton 
University, 7 October 1971) at 1 [unpublished]. What the Code does is to 
announce that it is the legal policy of Ontario that the protected identity traits will 
rarely be a relevant consideration for decision-making in the workplace. 
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self-fulfilling.30 The Code seeks to halt the continued deployment of 
inaccurate and discriminatory notions of personal value in regulated 
market relationships. 
4. THE ONTARIO HUMAN RIGHTS CODE’S 
DISTRIBUTIVE FUNCTION
As explained in Part 3 above, the Code targets the use of 
inaccurate or irrelevant protected identity traits in regulated market 
relationships. The Code seeks, in Fraser’s terminology, to remedy 
the psychosocial and distributional consequences of misrecognition 
discrimination. In this sense, it engages with the interrelationship 
of distributional and misrecognition discrimination. How does it do 
this? And what does distribution mean in this context? 
On one level, all legal rights and entitlements (or their absence) 
create mechanisms for distributing resources within relationships.31 
Human rights statutes operate in this way, as do all legal regimes. 
When people speak of distributional strategies, however, they are 
usually referring to something more than the small-scale wealth 
transfer that occurs in any legal proceeding. Distributive mechan-
isms are often described as those which have an effect beyond the 
parties. Obvious examples are statutes and constitutional provisions 
30 Ian Ayres explains the following example of the way stereotypes and mispercep-
tions can be reinforcing using the example of car sales: “Beliefs that are based 
on erroneous stereotypes may not be tested by the market equilibrium. If market 
experience does not teach sellers that their preconceptions are false, disparate 
treatment that is both inequitable and inefficient will persist. For example, if 
sellers refuse to bargain seriously with blacks because of a belief that they are 
generally too poor to buy cars, then blacks will continue not to buy cars because 
of inflated prices, and that will only reaffirm the sellers’ original mistaken 
belief.” Ian Ayres, “Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car 
Negotiations” (1991) 104:4 Harv L Rev 817 at 850-851. Although prejudices 
may be inaccurate in that they do not speak to individuals’ innate capacities, they 
may create systemic economic blockages that build up in self-fulfilling ways. For 
instance, the denial of job opportunities may have a follow-on effect on other 
economic opportunities for workers and their families, leading to generational 
differentials in levels of education and training, so that the prejudicial assump-
tion becomes factually accurate over time. 
31 Duncan Kennedy, “The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault!” (1991) 15:4 Legal 
Studies Forum 327.
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regulating state resources: for instance, tax and property legislation 
and section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
serve to set the rules of resource entitlement. In the private sector, 
collective bargaining is a central distributional mechanism, instituting 
a process of negotiation over the allocation of work-related resources 
between collective units of workers and their employers. Legislation 
and collective bargaining both effect distribution through an a priori 
determination of which categories of people can access the particular 
resources as of right. 
Because human rights codes do not set a priori rules for resource 
entitlements, they are less often thought of as distributional mechan-
isms. Nonetheless, because they regulate how resources and oppor-
tunities are allocated for those with protected identity traits within 
market-based relationships, they do play a central distributional 
role, imposing obligations that are either self-enforced or enforced 
through litigation. The remedial powers provided for in the codes 
aim to remedy the effects of discrimination rather than to place blame 
for it. In O’Malley v. Simpson-Sears, the Supreme Court of Canada 
explained: “The Code aims at the removal of discrimination . . . . Its 
main approach is not to punish the discriminator, but rather to provide 
relief for the victims of discrimination. It is the result or the effect of 
the action complained of which is significant.”32
To dismantle discriminatory barriers and provide relief for vic-
tims, the HRTO has been given very broad remedial powers, par-
ticularly since the 2006 amendments to the Code. If the Tribunal 
determines that a Code violation has occurred, it can order the infrin-
ging party to pay monetary compensation for “loss arising out of 
the infringement including for injury to dignity, feelings and self-re-
spect,”33 to make restitution “other than through monetary compen-
sation,”34 and “to do anything that, in the opinion of the Tribunal, the 
party ought to do to promote compliance with this Act.”35 The Code 
32 Ontario (Human Rights Commission) and O’Malley v Simpson-Sears Ltd, [1985] 
2 SCR 536 at 547, 23 DLR (4th) 321; Canadian National Railway Co v Canada 
(Canadian Human Rights Commission), [1987] 1 SCR 1114, 40 DLR (4th) 193 
[Action Travail des Femmes].
33 OHRC, supra note 2, s 45.2(1)1.
34 Ibid, s 45.2(1)2.
35 Ibid, s 45.2(1)3.
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also specifies that the power to order a party “to do anything” can 
include directions about future practices, and may be exercised even 
in the absence of a request to exercise it.36
Prominent among the remedial powers which are central to the 
Code’s distributional functions are the Tribunal’s authority to order 
systemic rights and remedies37 and public interest remedies,38 as well 
as the authority to enforce the duty to accommodate.39 In exercising 
these powers, the Tribunal seeks to change decision-making struc-
tures to create socioeconomic space for workers who have been dis-
criminatorily excluded. The Code is also distributional in authorizing 
individual remedies for past harms, which seek to put claimants in the 
position they would have been in had it not been for the breach of the 
Code. This aspect of the Tribunal’s remedial authority permits com-
pensation (both monetary and non-monetary) for “losses arising out 
of the infringement,” including injury to dignity and self-respect.40 In 
that way, the Code acts to shift the economic losses that arise from 
discrimination to the respondent — the party who is usually best able 
to absorb or spread those losses. 
(a) Systemic Remedies in Systemic Discrimination Claims
The Code permits claims by individuals and groups on the basis 
of systemic discrimination.41 These types of claims have the greatest 
36 Ibid, ss 45.2(2)(a)-(b).
37 Ibid, ss 45.2(1)(3) and 45.2(2).
38 Ibid, s 45.3(1).
39 Ibid, s 11(2).
40 Ibid, s 45.2(1)(1).
41 Ibid, s 34(4) allows two or more people who have individual claims to join them 
together. The Ontario Code has more limited standing rules than those in other 
jurisdictions: a person or organization can bring a claim on behalf of another 
only with the consent of someone who is entitled to bring an application. In other 
jurisdictions, public interest groups may bring claims on behalf of a marginalized 
group without a directly affected applicant. This is particularly useful in systemic 
discrimination claims. See Karen R Spector, Tess Sheldon & Laurie Letheren, 
“Barriers to the Claims of Systemic Discrimination Brought By People with 
Disabilities” (Paper delivered at the Ontario Bar Association Annual Update on 
Human Rights: Keeping on Top of Key Developments, Toronto, 8 June 2012) 
at 7-10.
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reach because they apply beyond the parties to the litigation. In Action 
Travail des Femmes, the Supreme Court of Canada described sys-
temic discrimination as consisting of “practices or attitudes that have, 
whether by design or impact, the effect of limiting an individual’s or a 
group’s right to the opportunities generally available because of attrib-
uted rather than actual characteristics.”42 The Court went on to say: 
It is not a question of whether this discrimination is motivated by an inten-
tional desire to obstruct someone’s potential, or whether it is the accidental 
by-product of innocently motivated practices or systems. If the barrier is 
affecting certain groups in a disproportionately negative way, it is a signal that 
the practices that lead to this adverse impact may be discriminatory.43
In other words, systemic discrimination claims are concerned with 
institutionalized policies, procedures and cultural environments which 
create patterns of exclusion for groups with protected characteris-
tics and encode subtle ideas of capacity based on stereotypes of skill 
and ability that preclude full workplace participation by members of 
the group. As the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal said in PSAC v. 
Canada (Treasury Board), “long-standing social and cultural mores 
carry within them value assumptions that contribute to discrimination 
in ways that are substantially or entirely hidden and unconscious.”44 
Remedies for systemic discrimination are distributional because 
they seek to identify, eliminate and transform structural processes 
of group exclusion. As Dickson C.J.C. explained in Action Travail 
des Femmes, “[t]he goal is not to compensate past victims or even 
to provide new opportunities for specific individuals who have been 
unfairly refused jobs or promotions in the past . . . [but] to ensure that 
future applicants and workers from the affected group will not face 
42 Action Travail de Femmes, supra note 32 at 1138-1139.
43 Ibid.
44 (1991), 14 CHRR D/341 at paras 36-38. As Colleen Sheppard has noted, there 
is often a conceptual slippage between adverse-effect discrimination and sys-
temic discrimination, although they are conceptually distinct. Colleen Sheppard, 
Inclusive Equality: The Relational Dimensions of Systemic Discrimination in 
Canada (Kingston, Ont: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010) at 22-23. 
Systemic discrimination is broader than adverse-effect discrimination. Rather 
than aiming solely at one particular policy or decision, it aims at directly and 
indirectly discriminatory social and operational practices which may be indi-
vidually unproblematic but together embed and replicate complicated patterns 
of exclusion.
06_Mumme.indd   158 14-08-27   10:25 AM
THE OHRC’s DISTRIBUTIVE AND RECOGNITIONAL FUNCTIONS   159
the same insidious barriers that blocked their forebears.”45 Systemic 
remedies have sometimes required such changes as amending work-
place policies that adversely impact certain groups,46 introducing pay 
equity systems,47 creating race relations committees,48 or appointing 
monitors to oversee the implementation of accommodation plans.49 
These types of remedies require employers to transform the future 
access of marginalized workers to opportunities and resources by 
dismantling cultures of exclusion. Their reach extends beyond the 
specific parties to include workers not yet hired. 
(b) Systemic Remedies in Individual Discrimination Claims
HRTO decisions sometimes suggest that systemic remedies are 
not available in individual discrimination claims.50 Others, however, 
recognize that “the Tribunal may make systemic remedies in any 
45 Action Travail des Femmes, supra note 32 at para 40.
46 Forrester v Peel (Regional Municipality) Police Services Board, 2006 HRTO 13, 
[2006] 56 CHRR D/215. This was not an employment case, but concerned police 
strip search policies for transsexual detainees.
47 Action Travail des Femmes, supra note 32 at para 40. 
48 McKinnon v Ontario (Correctional Services), 2005 HRTO 15, 52 CHRR D/387 
[McKinnon].
49 Lepofsky v Toronto Transit Commission, 2007 HRTO 23 at paras 9 & 15, 61 
CHRR 511. See also National Capital Alliance on Race Relations v Canada 
(Department of Health & Welfare), 28 CHRR 179, [1997] CHRD No 3 (QL). 
The remedial authority of human rights tribunals in regard to systemic discrimin-
ation is very broad, but systemic remedies face significant enforcement difficul-
ties. See Dianne Pothier, “Adjudicating Systemic Equality Issues: The Unfilled 
Promise of Action Travail des Femmes” (2014) 18:1 CLELJ 177. In some cases, 
tribunals have remained seized of the matter to ensure compliance with an 
order. See Lepofsky, supra. Compare Coast Mountain Bus Co Ltd v National 
Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers of Canada 
(CAW – Canada), Local 111, 2010 BCCA 447 at paras 100-103, 10 BCLR (5th) 
65, where the Court held that a tribunal member had exceeded her jurisdiction by 
ordering (in addition to a cease-and-desist order) tribunal-supervised mediation 
with a view to the negotiation of a new non-discriminatory policy to replace the 
discriminatory one, and by remaining seized of the matter. The Court held that 
such orders would do nothing, beyond what the cease-and-desist order had done, 
to help alleviate the effects of discrimination.
50 For a recent example, see Filion v Capers Restaurant, 2010 HRTO 264 (CanLII).
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case.”51 In Ontario there is neither a separate definition of systemic 
discrimination nor provision for any special remedial rules for it, and 
there is in fact considerable room for claimants to access structural 
remedies in individual claims.52 As noted above, the Tribunal may 
make an order directing any party to an application “to do anything 
that, in the opinion of the Tribunal, the party ought to do to promote 
compliance with the Act.”53 Such an order may concern future prac-
tices, and may be made even if not requested.54 Remedies of this sort 
have been described as public interest remedies, and are equivalent 
to systemic remedies. Thus, the HRTO appears to have the same 
power to order forward-looking remedies in individual claims as in 
systemic claims.55
The Ontario Human Rights Code does not provide any direction 
as to when the Tribunal should exercise its discretion to order a public 
interest remedy if the claimant has not asked for one, and there is no 
case law on the question. That discretion has so far been exercised 
in an ad hoc way. The Pinto Report said that some form of public 
interest remedy had been ordered in approximately “60% of the cases 
in which discrimination was found,” but often consist of no more than 
a requirement of human rights training.56 
There are good reasons why the Tribunal should be more pro-
active in ordering public interest remedies. It is not clear whether 
claimants know that such remedies can be requested, or what those 
remedies might entail. As the Pinto Report noted, 53% of claimants 
51 GA (Next friend of) v York Region District School Board, 2009 HRTO 1269 at para 
2, [2009] OHRTD No 1245 (QL). Because of the limited standing provisions of 
the Code, the HRTO often holds that only claimants whose individual rights have 
been violated can bring systemic claims. This is problematic but consistent with 
the Code’s provisions. More questionable is the growing practice of limiting evi-
dence of systemic discrimination if it is not sufficiently connected to the individual 
claimant, thus limiting the contextual evidence that a claimant can introduce. For 
an example, see Carasco v University of Windsor, 2012 HRTO 195 (CanLII).
52 Human Rights Code, CCSM, c H-175, s 9(3) has a definition of systemic dis-
crimination, but no code provides for special remedies for systemic discrimin-
ation claims. The Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, c H-6, s 40.1(2)(b), 
specifies that a claim cannot be based solely on statistical evidence demonstrat-
ing the under-representation of a designated group.
53 OHRC, supra note 2, s 45.2(1)(3) [emphasis added].
54 Ibid, s 45.2(2).
55 Ibid, s 45.2(1)(3).
56 Pinto Report, supra note 1 at 75.
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were unrepresented at Tribunal hearings. The instructional materials 
prepared to help applicants through the process do not clearly set out 
the nature of a public interest remedy. The Applicant’s Guide notes 
that the Tribunal may order remedies to prevent further human rights 
violations, whereas the claim application form itself simply allows a 
claimant to check off a request for a future compliance remedy and to 
explain what order the claimant is asking from the Tribunal.57 This is 
not sufficient to justify the assumption that most claimants, especially 
those without legal representation, will understand what a public inter-
est remedy is or will realize that they may ask for one. It would there-
fore be useful for the Tribunal itself to raise the possibility of a public 
interest remedy in appropriate cases, particularly where the evidence 
suggests that the employer might be unclear about its obligations 
or that there is an entrenched culture of discrimination. Where the 
Tribunal identifies a problematic practice, policy or workplace culture, 
it should not be content with merely ordering human rights training.58
Systemic and public interest remedies requiring specific steps 
to dismantle systems of exclusion are powerful tools available to 
the Tribunal. They are distributional in nature, in that they require 
employers to change how decisions are made in order to ensure that 
opportunities are equally accessible to everyone in the workplace. 
(c) The Duty to Accommodate: The Dynamics of 
Workplace Change
Like systemic and public interest remedies, the duty to accom-
modate operates as a distributional mechanism. It imposes positive 
57 Ibid at 45; Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, Applicant’s Guide at 11, online: 
<http://www.hrto.ca>.
58 The HRTO appears to grant more complex public interest remedies primar-
ily in cases where the Commission intervenes. This is presumably because the 
Commission will have given thought to the content of a useful public interest 
remedy in the circumstances. Indeed, while there does not appear to be a political 
interest in such a move, the Commission’s statutory mandate would permit it 
to take a more active advisory role in helping those found to have breached the 
Code to improve their policies and procedures, which would alleviate the burden 
on small businesses. Moreover, although this is not within its current mandate, 
the Commission might also usefully consider taking on a more direct role in 
monitoring the implementation of systemic and public interest remedies, which 
have proven notoriously difficult to enforce in the absence of a trade union.
06_Mumme.indd   161 14-08-27   10:25 AM
162   CDN. LABOUR & EMPLOYMENT LAW JOURNAL [18 CLELJ]
obligations on the employer to undertake a process of communica-
tion with the worker in order to craft a flexible working arrangement 
that meets the worker’s needs and abilities as closely as possible. As 
the Supreme Court recognized in the Eldridge case, “the principle 
that discrimination can accrue from a failure to take positive steps to 
ensure that disadvantaged groups benefit equally from services offered 
to the general public is widely accepted in the human rights field.”59 
The Code requires accommodation in all regulated relationships. 
Once a prima facie case of discrimination is established, an employer 
may argue that it was not obligated to accommodate because the dis-
criminatory practice or exclusion was based on a BFOR. Proving a 
BFOR requires an employer to demonstrate that the challenged policy 
was adopted for a rational purpose connected to the position, that it 
was adopted in good faith, and that the complainant cannot be accom-
modated without imposing undue hardship on the employer.60 As 
explained in Part 3 above, this requires an employer to justify both its 
workplace goals and the characteristics it has identified as necessary 
to meet those goals. The employer must then demonstrate that there 
is no way to accommodate a worker who has been excluded on a pro-
hibited ground and still achieve its goals. The Ontario Human Rights 
Commission’s Guidelines on Disability and Accommodation say: 
[T]he rule or standard itself must be inclusive and must accommodate individual 
differences up to the point of undue hardship rather than maintaining discrimina-
tory standards supplemented by accommodation for those who cannot meet 
them. This ensures that each person is assessed according to his or her own per-
sonal abilities instead of being judged against presumed group characteristics.61
The standard for undue hardship is exacting. It is fact-specific, 
requiring an individualized consideration62 of safety, cost, interfer-
ence with a collective agreement, size of the employer’s operation, 
59 Eldridge v British Columbia (AG), [1997] 3 SCR 624 at para 78.
60 OHRC, supra note 2, ss 11(1)-11(2); Meiorin, supra note 24.
61 Ontario Human Rights Commission, Policy and Guidelines on Disability and 
the Duty to Accommodate, 2000, revised in 2009 [Guidelines on Disability and 
Accommodation], §4.2, online: <http://www.ohrc.on.ca>, quoting from the 
Supreme Court of Canada decision in Grismer, supra note 24 at para 19.
62 Entrop v Imperial Oil Ltd (No 6) (1995), 23 CHRR D/196 (Ont Bd Inq), aff’d 
(2000), 50 OR (3d) 18 (CA); McGill University Health Centre (Montreal 
General Hospital) v Syndicat des employés de l’Hôpital général de Montréal, 
2007 SCC 4 at para 22, [2007] 1 SCR 161.
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employee morale and the interchangeability of the workforce and 
facilities.63 It has recently been held also to include a consideration 
of the legitimate operational requirements of the workforce.64 As 
Michael Lynk has put it, the accommodation case law requires the 
employer to demonstrate that its “efforts were serious, conscientious, 
genuine, and represented its best efforts.”65 Moreover, if the employer 
cannot prove that the impugned standard, policy or decision has a 
legitimate objective, or that no accommodation can be provided 
short of undue hardship, then the entire standard or policy is struck 
down.66 This affects not just the worker bringing the claim, but also 
others who are similarly situated in the workplace. In this sense, the 
duty to accommodate can operate as a systemic remedy, reaching 
63 Central Alberta Dairy Pool v Alberta (Human Rights Commission), [1990] 2 
SCR 489, 72 DLR (4th). Some codes specify factors that may be considered in 
the undue hardship analysis. The OHRC, supra note 2, s 11(2), for example, lists 
cost, health and safety, and outside sources of funding.
64 In Hydro-Québec v Syndicat des employé-e-s de techniques professionnelles 
et de bureau d’Hydro-Québec, section locale 2000 (SCFP-FTQ), 2008 SCC 
43, [2008] 2 SCR 561, the Supreme Court specified that the question was not 
whether it was impossible to accommodate the worker, but whether it was 
impossible to do so short of undue hardship. This is correct as far as it goes. 
However, the Court went on to say: “The purpose of the duty to accommodate 
is to ensure that persons who are otherwise fit to work are not unfairly excluded 
where working conditions can be adjusted without undue hardship” (ibid at para 
14). The test, the Court explained, “is not whether it was impossible to accom-
modate the employee’s characteristics. The employer does not have a duty to 
change working conditions in a fundamental way, but does have a duty, if it can 
do so without undue hardship, to arrange the employee’s workplace or duties to 
enable the employee to do his or her work” (ibid at para 16). The problem with 
this analysis arises from the need to decide what is meant by “fit to work” and 
by “fundamental changes to the working conditions.” Again, it appears correct to 
say that the duty to accommodate does not require an employer to create work 
that it does not need. But an employer does have a duty to analyze how its needs 
are to be met, and how equal opportunity to meet those needs can be provided in 
the light of the individual worker’s capacities, short of undue hardship. Despite 
the way the Court framed the undue hardship standard in Hydro-Québec, the 
weight of the case law continues to see that standard as an exacting one.
65 Michael Lynk, “Disability at Work: The Transformation of the Legal Status 
of Employees with Disabilities in Canada” in R Echlin & C Paliare, eds, Law 
Society of Upper Canada Special Lectures 2007: Employment Law (Toronto: 
Irwin Law, 2008) 189 at 227.
66 Pothier, supra note 49 at 201.
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beyond the individual claimant to require transformation in work-
place decision-making.
A worker who remains in the employment relationship may 
argue that more appropriate accommodation should be provided than 
that offered by the employer.67 Although such claims do not have a 
direct reach beyond the parties, they are important because they show 
how the duty to accommodate operates to transform resource distribu-
tion in the workplace. To determine an appropriate accommodation, 
human rights decision-makers undertake a detailed substantive review 
of what the duty mandates in the particular circumstances.68 Unlike the 
analysis of the justifiability of a breach of a constitutional right under 
section 1 of the Charter, this is not a proportionality-based review. 
Instead, it looks to what both the claimant and the employer have to 
do (procedurally and substantively) to make room for the claimant to 
participate in the workplace, in light of the claimant’s capacities and 
restrictions and in light of any constraints on the employer.69 
67 Because a claim for appropriate accommodation does not seek to strike down 
a standard but to modify its application, such a claim may be impractical in the 
absence of a union, which can help to monitor the ongoing conversation required 
for proper accommodation
68 Guidelines on Disability and Accommodation, supra note 61 at §4.3.
69 Meiorin, supra note 24. Once accommodation is requested, the employer must 
examine what methods are available to provide the employee with duties that 
they can fulfill. Michael Lynk describes four steps in the accommodation investi-
gation process: 
(1) [F]irst determining whether the employee can productively fulfill her 
existing job as presently constituted; (2) if not, then determining whether she 
can perform the core aspects of the original job in a modified or re-bundled 
form; (3) if not, determining whether the employee can accomplish the dut-
ies of another job in its present form; and finally (4) if not, then determining 
whether she could perform another job in a modified or re-bundled fashion. 
Lynk, supra note 65 at 229. In some circumstances, the search for accommo-
dation may permit a disabled worker to displace a co-worker, or may require 
the employer to modify a co-worker’s duties. In cases of physical disabilities, 
work schedules and the physical requirements of the job often have to be modi-
fied. For mental disabilities, social and environmental modifications may also be 
required, as well as scheduling changes. Ibid at 228; Guidelines on Disability and 
Accommodation, supra note 61 at 15-20; Canadian Human Rights Commission, 
Policy and Procedures on Accommodation and Mental Health (Canadian Human 
Rights Commission, October 2008) at 6, online: <http://www.chrc-ccdp.ca>.
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The duty to accommodate obviously has limits. The employer 
does not have to create a position that does not provide value to 
its operations, and can expect the worker to be able to perform the 
core aspects of the accommodated position.70 Nonetheless, the duty 
imposes on the employer an ongoing requirement to engage with the 
worker about her limitations and capacities and to creatively adjust 
the physical, operational and social environment of the workplace 
with a view to enabling her to participate meaningfully.
The duty to accommodate is at the heart of the statutory human 
rights analysis; it reflects the dignity value inherent in interaction 
between the parties about their needs, and it leads to the creation of 
actual opportunities for work. Where an impugned standard is found 
not to be a BFOR, it is struck down, creating the space for a new 
process to be set in place that meets the Code’s standards. Thus, just 
as systemic remedies can be used to change policies and processes 
that distribute resources in the workplace, the duty to accommodate 
requires employers and workers to work together to change the work-
place environment to provide access to economic resources based on 
each party’s capacities and needs.
(d) Remedying the Effects of Discrimination on an Individual
Because human rights claims are concerned with the effects of 
discrimination, the purpose of individual remedies is to put claimants 
in the position they would have been in had it not been for the dis-
crimination.71 The Tribunal is empowered to order compensation for 
the losses that arise from infringements of the Code, including mon-
etary compensation for economic loss and for injury to dignity and 
self-respect, as well as non-monetary restitution for harm suffered.72 
Individual remedies act as cost-shifting mechanisms which lift the 
economic burden of discriminatory exclusion from the worker and 
place it on the party that is usually better able to bear or reallocate it. 
70 Lynk, ibid at 228. If there is no reasonable prospect of a return to work, the duty 
to accommodate may not require the employer to go any further. Hydro-Québec, 
supra note 64 at para 18.
71 Impact Interiors v Ontario (Human Rights Commission) (1998), 35 CHRR D/477 
(Ont CA).
72 OHRC, supra note 2, s 45.2(1)(1).
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(i) Reinstatement 
Reinstatement is a make-whole remedy in the full sense of the 
term, because it puts the worker back in his or her job. However, 
informal discussions with lawyers who practise in the area, as well 
as Tribunal members, suggest that reinstatement is infrequently 
requested before the Human Rights Tribunal. Despite the HRTO’s 
clear power to order reinstatement, there also appears to be some 
confusion over how that power should be used. In hearing employee 
complaints of dismissal for reasons prohibited under the Code, the 
Tribunal has sometimes adopted a viability approach similar to that 
taken by arbitrators in the unionized sector and by adjudicators under 
section 240 of the Canada Labour Code.73 In Krieger v. Toronto 
Police Services Board,74 HRTO Vice-Chair Naomi Overend said: 
“The goal of human rights legislation, which is remedial in nature, is 
to put the applicant in the position that he or she would have been in 
had the discrimination not taken place.”75 She went on to add the fol-
lowing: “Where viable, reinstatement is sometimes the only remedy 
that can give effect to this principle.”76
In unionized workplaces, labour arbitrators under collective 
agreements have long treated reinstatement as the presumptive rem-
edy when they find that an employee was discharged without just 
cause.77 In the 2004 case of Alberta Union of Provincial Employees v. 
Lethbridge Community College,78 the Supreme Court of Canada said: 
As a general rule, where a grievor’s collective agreement rights have 
been violated, reinstatement of the grievor to her previous position will 
73 RSC 1985, c L-2. See Krieger v Toronto Police Services Board, 2010 HRTO 
1361 at para 172, 70 CHRR D/405 [Krieger]; Moffatt v Kinark Child and Family 
Services, 37 CHRR D/409, [1999] OHRBID No 15 at para 96 (QL) (Ont Bd Inq).
74 Krieger, ibid at para 182.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid [emphasis added].
77 Probably because of the presence of a union to protect reinstated employees 
against reprisals after they return to the job, studies have shown that the rem-
edy has worked quite well, in the sense that employees usually remain in the 
workplace for a substantial time after being reinstated. See, for example, Peter 
J Barnacle, Arbitration of Discharge Grievances in Ontario: Outcome and 
Reinstatement Experience (Kingston, Ont: Queen’s IRC Press, 1991).
78 2004 SCC 28 at para 56, [2004] 1 SCR 727, 238 DLR (4th).
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normally be ordered.  Departure from this position should only occur where 
the arbitration board’s findings reflect concerns that the employment relation-
ship is no longer viable.  In making this determination, the arbitrator is entitled 
to consider all of the circumstances relevant to fashioning a lasting and final 
solution to the parties’ dispute.
The Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in the Parry Sound case 
held that “the substantive rights and obligations of the Human Rights 
Code are incorporated into each collective agreement over which 
the Board has jurisdiction.”79 But while continuing to undertake a 
viability analysis, in the vast number of arbitration cases in which 
employers are alleged to have discriminated against employees on 
grounds prohibited by the Code, arbitrators have continued to treat 
reinstatement as the presumptive remedy for discrimination. 
In Ontario, non-unionized employees have no recourse to an 
adjudicative forum for complaints of unjust dismissal; their only 
recourse is to a common law wrongful dismissal action in the courts, 
where reinstatement is not available. In the federal sector, however, 
employees do have statutory protection against unfair dismissal under 
section 240 of the Canada Labour Code,80 and adjudicators hearing 
claims under that provision have the authority to award reinstate-
ment. At one time, many section 240 adjudicators took what Geoffrey 
England called the “lion’s jaws” approach81 — the approach that it 
was futile (in the absence of a union) to put an employee whom the 
employer wanted to get rid of back into the workplace, because the 
employee was unlikely to last and would be better off with a monetary 
award. England argued strongly that if an employee had indeed been 
unfairly dismissed and wished to take on the risks of reinstatement, 
that wish should be respected — that it was not the adjudicator’s role 
to decide what remedy was in the employee’s best interests.82 
Section 240 adjudicators now generally accept England’s view, 
refusing reinstatement only on the basis of a viability approach quite 
79 Parry Sound (District) Social Services Administration Board v Ontario Public 
Service Employees Union, Local 324, 2003 SCC 42 at para 23, [2003] 3 SCR 
157 [Parry Sound].
80 Supra note 73.
81 Geoffrey England & Innis Christie, Employment Law in Canada (Markham, Ont: 
LexisNexis Butterworths), 4th ed (looseleaf) (principal revising author, Peter 
Barnacle) at §17.161.
82 Ibid.
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similar to that taken by arbitrators under collective agreements: i.e., 
only when they find that the employee’s overall conduct (before the 
dismissal, or perhaps more often, after it) provides objective and not 
merely subjective support for the employer’s claim that the employee 
has forfeited the trust needed for a viable employment relationship. As 
the Federal Court of Appeal recently noted in the section 240 case of 
Payne v. Bank of Montreal, “while reinstatement is not a right, in prac-
tice it is the remedy favoured by adjudicators for unjust dismissal, save 
for exceptional circumstances.”83 In Payne, the Court said that a crucial 
question was whether the employer could “ever have confidence in the 
employee’s judgment again, such that it should be prepared to run the 
risk of further misconduct”84 — a question which the Court described 
as having “a pronounced forward-looking character.”85 
Given that reinstatement is a strong presumption both where 
arbitrators have a mandate to think about the employment rela-
tionship’s long-term viability, and where there may be an issue of 
worker misconduct, as with unjust dismissal claims under Part III of 
the Canada Labour Code, it should surely be a strong presumption 
before the Human Rights Tribunal, where neither viability nor worker 
misconduct are at issue. 
(ii) Individual Monetary Awards
The Code provides for individual monetary awards for eco-
nomic loss arising from an infringement, as well as for injuries to 
dignity and self-respect.86 In calculating compensation for injuries 
to dignity and self-respect, the HRTO looks to the seriousness of the 
injury, as well as to the applicant’s particular experience and his or 
83 Adjudicators look closely at the overall nature of the relationship between the 
worker, the employer and other employees, and to other institutional factors 
which may make reinstatement unviable, such as the abolition of the job or the 
bankruptcy of the employer. Bank of Montreal v Payne, 2013 FCA 33 at para 
86, 443 NR 253 [Payne]. See also England & Christie, supra note 81 at §17.157, 
citing Ella v Trans-Northern Pipelines Inc, [1992] CLAD No 7 (QL); Anthony 
and Kamloops Indian Band, [1997] CLAD No 49 (QL). 
84 Payne, ibid at para 88.
85 Ibid. 
86 OHRC, supra note 2, s 45.2(1).
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her reaction to what happened.87 The aim is to provide monetary com-
pensation for the psychosocial effects of discrimination. The basis 
on which the Code provides compensation for monetary loss is less 
clearly articulated. Section 45.2(1) states that financial compensa-
tion may be ordered for “loss arising out of the infringement . . . .” 
The Tribunal takes a make-whole approach to its remedial authority, 
seeking to put claimants in the position they would have been in but 
for the Code violation. Financial losses usually involve wages and 
employment-related benefits.88 Where a claimant asserts the loss of a 
job opportunity or promotion, the prevailing approach in Ontario is to 
assess the likelihood that he or she would have realized the particular 
opportunity; if there was at least a 50% chance, the claimant recovers 
the full loss.89 Tribunals in some other jurisdictions award compensa-
tion on the basis of the probability that the complainant would have 
realized the opportunity in question.90
Once in a while, a claim is made for compensation for losses 
that do not stem directly from a breach of the complainant’s terms of 
employment but do arise from a discriminatory act by the employer. 
For instance, a claimant recently requested a remedy on account of 
Employment Insurance (EI) maternity benefits for which she did not 
qualify because of her discriminatory termination by the employer.91 
The Tribunal denied the request on the ground that EI benefits were 
not “income that would have been earned from the [employer] had 
there been no discrimination.”92 Instead, it ordered that her Record 
of Employment form93 be reissued to reflect the higher amount she 
87 Arunachalam v Best Buy Canada Ltd, 2010 HRTO 1880 at paras 53-54 (CanLII).
88 Workplace benefits that would have accrued but for the discrimination are usually 
compensable. Jodoin v Ciro’s Jewellers (Mayfair) Inc, [1996] OHRBID No 1 at 
paras 29-33 (QL). Where there is a discriminatory demotion or an accommoda-
tion plan that imposes a reduction in wages, a worker may be able to claim the 
difference between the old and new rates.
89 DeSouza v 1469328 Ontario, 2008 HRTO 23 at paras 82-83, 63 CHRR D/197; 
Davis v Toronto (City of), 2011 HRTO 806 at paras 149-151 (CanLII).
90 Chopra v Canada (AG), 2007 FCA 268, 283 DLR (4th) 634 [Chopra].
91 Purres v London Athletic Club (South) Inc, 2012 HRTO 1758, 75 CHHR D/252.
92 Ibid at para 40.
93 This is “the form . . . that employers complete for employees receiving insurable 
earnings who stop working and experience an interruption of earnings. The ROE 
is the single most important document in the Employment Insurance (EI) pro-
gram.” Online: <http://www.servicecanada.gc.ca>.
06_Mumme.indd   169 14-08-27   10:25 AM
170   CDN. LABOUR & EMPLOYMENT LAW JOURNAL [18 CLELJ]
would have earned had it not been for the discrimination, so that 
she could apply for reconsideration of her EI benefits. This allowed 
her to be made whole without imposing the cost of doing so on her 
employer. Where no such option is available, the assessment of dam-
ages should focus on losses that arose from the infringement rather 
than on the narrower concept of “income from employment.”
Indeed, section 45.2(1) of the Code sets out a very broad 
remedial power, permitting compensation for far-ranging economic 
consequences that may flow from discrimination. Exclusion from an 
economic opportunity in the workplace will often have a significant 
impact on one’s ability to support oneself, to afford one’s home, or to 
access social benefits. As long as a claimant’s financial losses are the 
result of a chain of events set in motion by a Code infringement, they 
are theoretically compensable. 
That the Code envisages compensation for the broad socio-
economic consequences of discrimination was implicitly accepted in 
the 2012 HRTO decision in Hayes v. Workplace Safety and Insurance 
Board. The Tribunal found that the refusal by the Ontario Workplace 
Safety and Insurance Board (WSIB) to permit direct deposit of WSIB 
benefits payable to the claimant was discriminatory on the basis of 
disability, because it was physically difficult for him to deposit the 
cheques at his bank.94 One of the people whom he therefore had to 
rely on to deposit the payments stole some of them. He alleged that he 
was thereby forced to declare bankruptcy, and that the resulting stress 
led to the dissolution of his marriage and to significant difficulties for 
his children. He argued that the losses for which he should be indem-
nified under the Code included the stolen benefits, his declaration of 
bankruptcy and the dissolution of his marriage, because none of these 
events would have occurred without the discrimination.
The Tribunal was prepared to accept that the theft was causally 
connected to the discrimination, because the claimant would not been 
vulnerable to theft if direct deposit had been available.95 It refused 
to award compensation for the claimant’s bankruptcy, as he was 
94 2012 HRTO 2126 (CanLII).
95 The Tribunal ordered the WSIB to pay to the applicant “$5,000 for his losses aris-
ing from the infringement of his rights under the Code” and “$1,800 for the direct 
loss occasioned by its refusal to directly deposit his benefits into his account.” 
Ibid at para 53. It is not clear from the decision how much compensation the 
claimant requested for the bankruptcy and the breakdown of his marriage. 
06_Mumme.indd   170 14-08-27   10:25 AM
THE OHRC’s DISTRIBUTIVE AND RECOGNITIONAL FUNCTIONS   171
severely in debt before the theft and it was not evident that the loss 
of his WSIB benefits caused the bankruptcy. It is not clear how the 
Tribunal would have ruled if the bankruptcy had been more closely 
tied to the breach of the Code. As for the marriage dissolution, the 
Tribunal found an insufficient causal nexus between the discrimina-
tion and the loss, and went on to note that in any case it was unclear 
that the respondent should be held responsible for this type of loss.96 
The Tribunal offered no additional explanation for why that loss 
would be outside the scope of what was compensable.
In short, the broad powers given to the HRTO under the Code 
to remedy individual discrimination are designed to put claimants 
in the position they would have been in but for the violation of the 
Code, with a view to shifting the psychosocial and financial costs of 
discrimination from the claimant’s shoulders. Far-reaching obliga-
tions are imposed on respondents because they have engaged in dis-
criminatory market behaviour that has led to a loss, and because they 
are the best placed to change that behaviour and absorb the losses. 
5. THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE’S RELATIONSHIP TO 
OTHER EQUALITY-SEEKING LEGAL MECHANISMS
As I have emphasized throughout this paper, the Code is 
designed to regulate both the distributional and the psychosocial 
96 Ibid at para 43. Because section 45.2(1) permits compensation for “loss arising 
out of the infringement” of the Code, the Tribunal hinted that there might need 
to be some limitations on the potential scope of employer liability. While in 
this case there was an insufficient causal nexus between the loss that arose and 
the infringement, in other cases human rights decision-makers have sometimes 
invoked the tort concepts of remoteness and foreseeability to circumscribe the 
scope of the damages for Code violations. In Chopra, supra note 90, the Federal 
Court of Appeal held that the use of the concept of remoteness was not appro-
priate in the human rights context because (unlike tort law), human rights law 
does not seek to limit liability to fault but to compensate for discrimination and 
to remove barriers to equality. Moreover, the Court explained, the Canadian 
Human Rights Act had its own limiting device — a provision specifically enum-
erating the kinds of losses that were recoverable. This provision, in tandem with 
the concept of causal nexus, does the limiting work that the concept of remote-
ness does in tort law, by stating that a compensatory remedy is available for “any 
or all of the wages that the victim was deprived of and . . . any expenses incurred 
by the victim as a result of the discriminatory practice” (ibid, ss 53(2)(c)-(d)) 
[emphasis added]. A similar logic applies under the Ontario Human Rights Code.
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effects of status and identity discrimination (or misrecognition dis-
crimination) in market-based relationships. It deals with the relation-
ships that most centrally affect our social and economic lives, where 
we live and work, and how we participate in our communities. It does 
so by restricting decisions which are explicitly or implicitly based on 
protected status traits, and which rely on those traits in an inaccurate 
or unjustified way. 
In the workplace, the Code’s systemic remedies seek to dis-
mantle employment systems and cultures that have an exclusionary 
impact, and thereby to redistribute opportunities. Redistribution 
is also done through the duty to accommodate, which forbids an 
employer from using decision-making factors that adversely affect 
a protected group unless there is no other way for the employer to 
achieve its legitimate goals without incurring undue hardship. The 
duty to accommodate transforms workplace relationships in ways that 
foster inclusivity and economic opportunity, and that sometimes reach 
beyond the parties themselves in order to effect systemic change. 
Analyzing the Code’s distributional and recognition functions 
also allows us to think about its relationship to other legal tools con-
cerned with inequality. Like the Code, section 15 of the Charter regu-
lates the problem of misrecognition based on status traits. However, 
because the Code primarily regulates misrecognition in market-based 
relationships, it does something different from and complementary 
to the constitutional equality guarantee. The Code primarily applies 
to actors in regulated market activities, while the Charter applies to 
the state’s legislative, administrative and resource distribution func-
tions. This difference is significant in three ways. First, distributional 
decisions by the state have a democratic grounding that distributional 
decisions by private actors do not have.97 Second, while both the 
97 As I have argued elsewhere, decisions on the allocation of public resources 
engage democratic principles and electoral mandates, while relationships 
between private actors do not. One can argue that there are also democratic 
implications when the state acts in a more “private” capacity — for example, as 
an employer, landlord or contract provider. However, my analysis here focuses 
on the relationships between non-state actors in private-sector relationships, 
because those relationships are the core concern of human rights codes. As we 
continue to flesh out the conceptual and operational structure of those codes in 
relation to the distributional consequences of discrimination, it will be neces-
sary to consider how proceedings involving the “Crown in right of” should be 
addressed. See Mummé, supra note 20.
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Code and section 15 of the Charter are concerned with the psycho-
social and economic effects of misrecognition discrimination, their 
scope is different.98 The Code’s distributional force lies in its applica-
tion to certain types of decision-making in the workplace and in other 
regulated relationships. In contrast, a successful challenge under sec-
tion 15 of the Charter may change the rules of citizen entitlement to 
governmental benefits and thereby affect public resource distribu-
tion. The difference is mainly one of scale, but scale is important to 
thinking through the impact of distributional mechanisms. Finally, 
it can be argued that a different logic underlies the imposition of 
human rights obligations on non-state as opposed to state actors. 
Human rights codes seek to preclude regulated market actors from 
creating and perpetuating exclusions in relationships that are central 
to the ability of people to participate economically and socially in 
their communities. Those actors are best situated to meet the cost 
of discrimination in their market activities. The Charter’s equality 
guarantee, on the other hand, imposes an anti-majoritarian check on 
government power, to ensure that electoral mandates are not exer-
cised in ways that unjustifiably deprive people of equal opportunities 
or impose differential treatment on prohibited grounds. Thus, while 
both the Code and section 15 of the Charter are concerned with the 
psychosocial and economic effects of misrecognition, they seek to 
eliminate those effects in different types of relationships, and with a 
different structural logic.
But what about the Code’s relationship to the more private 
phenomena of collective bargaining and union representation? The 
argument presented in this paper is that the Code is centrally con-
cerned with both the economic and social effects of discrimination 
and inequality. While collective bargaining is also centrally con-
cerned with resource redistribution and workers’ dignity, it is often 
presented as being in tension with the objectives of the Code. Trade 
unions are thought to bargain distributional rules in the interests of 
the entire bargaining unit, while human rights statutes impose dis-
tributional obligations only in regard to certain types of workers. On 
that reasoning, the Code acts as an anti-majoritarian check on the 
98 Here again, I leave aside the Code’s application to government services, because 
(as noted above) it raises a host of questions that do not apply to other mar-
ket-based relationships regulated by the Code. 
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process of collective bargaining and on the enforcement of collective 
agreements. At the same time, as Elizabeth Shilton argues, unions are 
deeply engaged in ensuring the implementation of Code obligations 
through grievance arbitration.99 
Nancy Fraser’s distinction between the distributional and 
misrecognition aspects of inequality adds another dimension to our 
understanding of the relationship between the Code and trade unions. 
Her analysis suggests that neither collective bargaining nor human 
rights legislation can by itself overcome both forms of inequality 
in the workplace. Trade unions collectively bargain resource dis-
tribution decisions at the workplace level, giving workers greater 
economic security and opportunity as well as an enhanced voice at 
work. While instituting neutral rules for distributing resources in the 
workplace will not be sufficient to eliminate cultural value systems 
which disadvantage minority workers, it may put those workers in 
a position to address human rights issues with their unions and their 
employers while remaining on the job. Moreover, unions can provide 
institutional support for reinstatement, they can monitor the imple-
mentation of tribunal orders, and they can work with employers to 
devise non-discriminatory policies and procedures. In other words, 
the distributional consequences of misrecognition discrimination can 
best be dealt with where (as in unionized workplaces) there is both a 
way of influencing the shape of a priori rules of resource distribution 
and a protected space in which to challenge the implementation of 
those rules to individual workers.
6. CONCLUSION
At a broad level, the analysis in this paper suggests that we need 
multiple legal tools oriented toward different types of inequality and 
different types of socioeconomic actors. Thinking about the recogni-
tion and redistribution functions of each of those tools allows us to 
bring them into closer conversation with one another. Because human 
rights codes only interact with parties once a regulated relationship 
exists, they cannot remove the structural barriers that impede access 
99 Elizabeth Shilton, “ ‘Everybody’s Business’: Human Rights Enforcement and the 
Union’s Duty to Accommodate” (2014) 18:1 CLELJ 209. 
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to such a relationship in the first place, and they cannot alone redress 
the histories of economic deprivation that determine people’s social 
and economic opportunities. In the end, identifying the specific role 
and contribution of human rights codes enables us to think about the 
full panoply of legal resources needed to address discrimination and 
socioeconomic inequality, and shines a spotlight on the need to bring 
those resources into alignment with one another.
06_Mumme.indd   175 14-08-27   10:25 AM
